In Hotelling type models consumers have the same transportation cost function. We deviate from this assumption and introduce two consumer types. Some consumers have linear transportation costs, while the others have quadratic transportation costs. If at most half the consumers have linear transportation costs, a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists for all symmetric locations. Furthermore, no general principle of differentiation holds. With two consumer types, the equilibrium pattern ranges from maximum to intermediate differentiation. The degree of product differentiation depends on the fraction of consumer types.
Introduction
Consumers assess the difference between ideal and actual good differently.
For instance, consider consumers whose ideal polo shirt brand is Lacoste. If these consumers wear a polo shirt from Quicksilver, say, they incur a disutility. This disutility may vary among consumers. Disutility varies because consumers differently assess the distance between ideal and actual good.
The observation that consumers value distance differently allows us to modify Hotelling's model of horizontal product differentiation. We use the modification to address equilibrium existence for Hotelling's model Let us motivate again different consumer types using Hotelling's cider example. We can view the firms' locations as the degree of sourness in the cider they offer. Consumers differ in the degree of sourness they desire. Now, consider consumers who prefer the most sour cider possible. All these consumers have the same address. If they consume the sweetest cider possible the distance between their preferred and their consumed good is the same. But these consumers do not necessarily attach the same importance to distance.
Consumers value the distance between ideal and consumed good differently. 1 Existence of equilibrium in Hotelling type models depends on basic assumptions and a number of parameters. Brenner (2001) provides a nice survey about the determinants of equilibrium existence and product differentiation. 2 We use linear and quadratic transportation cost functions, as these types are well known and widely used in literature.
With our modification we remain very close to Hotelling's model. But we find pure strategy equilibrium existence for any symmetric locations if at most half the consumers have a disutility linear in distance. By contrast, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists for all symmetric locations if more than half the consumers have linear transportation costs.
Previous studies with modifications of Hotelling's model reject a general principle of differentiation 3 . We also reject a general principle of differentiation. With two consumer types, differentiation between firms' goods depends on the fraction of the respective types. However, maximum differentiation is frequent. Firms locate at the extremes in product space for fractions of consumers with linear transportation costs between zero and one third. When the fraction of consumers with linear transportation costs exceeds one third, firms move towards each other. Equilibrium locations are interior solutions.
If the number of consumers with linear transportation costs is high (approximately 0.86) the equilibrium distance between firms increases again. This increase is due to restrictions for location spaces that we impose to solve the non-existence problem. Firms must keep a minimal required distance. For large fractions of consumers with linear transportation costs firms locate as close to each other as the minimal required distance allows. The minimal required distance between firms is increasing in the fraction of consumers with linear transportation costs. Hence, product differentiation also increases.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we set up Hotelling's model with two consumer types. Next, in section 3, we derive the demand functions and the equilibrium. In section 4 we discuss the equilibrium outcome.
Finally, we conclude in section 5.
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, each selling one good. The goods are identical except for a one dimensional characteristic. This characteristic represents for example the sweetness of cider or a firm's brand. Firms choose the amount of characteristic by locating on a line with length one. Each firm's location q i ∈ [0, 1] measures the amount of characteristic embodied in the good. We assume that firm 1 locates to the left of firm 2, i.e., q 1 < q 2 . Firm i sells its good at mill price p i . Let us also assume, for simplicity, that both firms produce at zero fixed and marginal costs.
Suppose there is a continuum of consumers with total mass one. All consumers have the same gross valuation r for exactly one unit of the good.
The valuation r is sufficiently high such that in equilibrium all consumers buy from one of the firms. So, valuation r is never binding and the market always covered.
Each consumer knows her individually preferred amount of characteristic embodied in the good. Denote a consumer's most preferred amount of characteristic by the address θ. If a consumer buys a good with a differentthan-ideal characteristic, she suffers a disutility. This disutility is the distance between q and θ weighted by the utility loss per unit distance t. Thus, a consumer with address θ pays the mill price p and transportation costs t|q − θ| when buying a good with characteristic q. We call the mill price plus the transportation costs the generalized price. A consumer who buys a good with characteristic q at price p has a utility depending on her address θ and her transportation costs type:
We study a two-stage price-then-location game. In the first stage firms simultaneously choose locations bearing in mind the subsequent price equilibrium. Given their locations, firms simultaneously set prices in the second stage. To solve the game we use the solution concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For both stages we look for equilibria in pure strategies. Implicitly, we assume thatθ l andθ c lie between q 1 and q 2 . It turns out that this is implied by existence of pure strategy equilibria in the price game.
The distributional assumptions for addresses and indifferent consumers' addresses give the following demand functions D i for firm i's good:
The Firms' Equilibrium Behavior
To find the subgame perfect equilibrium we solve the location-then-price game by backwards induction. In the second stage we look for a BertrandNash equilibrium in prices. That is, firm i takes locations and p j as given and
The F.O.Cs. for the firms' maximization problems yield their price reaction functions: The reaction functions are linearly increasing functions of the other firm's price. Therefore, we can solve the system of equations given by the reaction functions to calculate the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices. The firms' equilibrium prices in the second stage, given their locations, are 
with the demand for good 1 and good 2 For an equilibrium to exist, the distance between the firms must satisfy
It is important to discuss the minimum required distance d(α) = (2α − 1)/(2α) in more detail. We discuss the minimum required distance for interior
the required distance is never greater than zero. Consequently, firms never find undercutting profitable. Let us give an intuition why undercutting is not profitable for α ≤ 1/2. With symmetric locations firms' prices are the same, i.e., p * 1 (q 1 , q 2 ) = p * 2 (q 1 , q 2 ). To gain the entire market, firm i reduces its price by t(q 2 − q 1 ). But this higher demand comes at the expense of a price reduction t(q 2 − q 1 ) for consumers that already buy from firm i. This expense is high if the price reduction is high relative to the price p * i (q 1 , q 2 ). The price reduction is high relative to p * i (q 1 , q 2 ) if α is small. For α ≤ 1/2 a gain in market share does not compensate for the loss due to a lower price. 
Differentiating firms' profits with respect to locations yields the following F.O.Cs.:
4 Note that we do not use equilibrium prices simplified by q 1 + q 2 = 1 to compute the equilibrium in locations.
A closer look at the F.O.Cs. shows that the relevant terms for firms' optimal locations are A 1 for firm 1 and A 2 for firm 2. Solving A i = 0 for q i yields firm i's optimal location as reaction function q i (q j ) of the other firm j's location. The equation A i = 0 is quadratic in q i and yields two solutions
Easy algebra shows that the first solution for firm 1's location reaction function implies q 1 (q 2 ) ≥ q 2 . Similarly, the second solution for firm 2's optimal location yields q 2 (q 1 ) ≤ q 1 . Hence, the economically meaningful reaction function for firm 1 is the second solution and for firm 2 the first solution. To keep track of, we restate the firms' location reaction functions:
The intersection of the reaction functions gives a closed form solution for an interior Nash equilibrium in locations (that is, one where 0 < q 1 < q 2 < 1).
To show the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium we need the reaction curves behavior. A detailed discussion of the reaction curves is relegated to the appendix. Here, we use the results in the appendix to determine firms' optimal location choices. For α > 1/3 an interior Nash equilibrium in locations exists and is given by the system of equations containing firms' reaction functions. Solving the system of equations for firm 1's location yields two solutions:
The solution q 1 = (1 + α + (1 − α)(5α + 1))/(4α) is not in the strategy space. In particular,
Therefore, we can exclude this first solution. Plugging q * 1 in firm 2's reaction function yields its optimal location: We summarize the firms' behavior in the location stage with Lemma 3:
Lemma 3 In Hotelling's location-then-price game with two types of consumers firms choose locations
and
We may summarize our findings and describe the equilibrium in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 In the Hotelling two-stage location-then-price game with fraction α of consumers with linear transportation costs and fraction 1 − α of consumers with quadratic transportation costs we find the following equilibria:
· if α ≤ 1/3 (i.e.,= π * 2 = t/2, · if 1/3 < α ≤ (1 + √ 10/2)/3 (i.e.
, α is intermediate) firms choose locations given by Lemma 3. Firms set the same price
and earn profits We begin the discussion with the degree of price competition. Our specification for the degree of price competition refers to the cross-price sensitivity of demand. The cross-price sensitivity is the amount of consumers firm i gains or loses as firm j changes its price
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. Thus, the cross-price sensitivity η in our model is:
where d = q 2 −q 1 . With this definition, a higher η indicates more intense price competition. Furthermore, note that η does not account for undercutting effects. But undercutting is ruled out. Therefore, we proceed the discussion about η without considering an undercutting process.
The degree of price competition η depends on parameters t and α as well as on distance d. First, price competition intensifies if t decreases, ceteris paribus. This is characteristic for Hotelling-type models, since t represents consumers' sensitivity to product differentiation. Consumers attach less importance to product differentiation when t is low. When t approaches zero, the model approaches Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods.
Secondly, the degree of price competition is decreasing in α, given t and To circumvent the non-existence problem we impose location restrictions on firms. Firms must keep the minimal required distance such that a purestrategy price equilibrium exists. This minimal required distance must go from zero to one half.
one. Let us also compare these slopes: For α < 1/3 firm 2's reaction function yields a value greater than 1 evaluated at (q 1 (q 2 = 1)). If α = 1/3 and (q 1 (q 2 = 1)) firm 2's optimal location is 1.
For α > 1/3 firm 2's reaction function takes a value less than 1 evaluated at (q 1 (q 2 = 1)). 
